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Abstract 
The problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance are considered as a plague for decades in 
Greek economy. They are considered among the root causes of the economical crisis we are experiencing nowadays. 
Any efforts proved futile to control and effectively address these thorny problems. On the other hand, nowadays, 
with the rapid growth of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), there is an increasing integration in 
both the public and private sectors. The use of the Internet and the integration of IT systems is a revolution for the 
enterprises and organizations. Also, with the development of e-government, the public agencies serve citizens and 
businesses from a distance and thus they offer better service and satisfaction to  citizens and businesses, and easier 
and more effective management of the work of public services. Given the change in both the organization and the 
functioning of businesses and public sector organizations on one side and the state control mechanisms on the other, 
it is now easier and more efficient to address the problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
The purpose of this paper is that the ELENXIS may prove an effective tool to address the aforementioned problems 
through the accounting information systems and e-government. Initially, the usefulness and the objectives of the 
accounting information systems and the e-government are presented. Then, the genesis and evolution of 
TAXISNET, as a platform for citizens, enterprises and public sector organizations, is described. Subsequently, an 
analysis of the pathogens of the economy with the major problems of the hidden economy, tax evasion and 
avoidance, and how the specialized for auditing, information system ELENXIS, aims at fighting these weaknesses. 
Finally, a research is presented. It consists of the analysis of 80 questionnaires, listing the views of tax consultants in 
the areas of Evros and Kavala about combating tax avoidance and evasion. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
The problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance are considered as a plague for decades in 
Greek economy (Kousoulakos et al., 1995; Pavlopoulos, 1987; Pavlopoulos, 2002). They are considered among the 
root causes of the economical crisis we are experiencing nowadays (Leventi and Matsaganis, 2013a;.Leventi and 
Matsaganis, 2013b). Any efforts proved futile to control and effectively address these thorny problems 
(Vasardani,2011).  
On the other hand, nowadays, with the rapid growth of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), 
there is an increasing integration in both the public and private sectors (Avgerou, 2002). The use of the Internet and 
the integration of IT systems is a revolution for enterprises and organizations (Emmanouilidis and Economides, 
2010; Kaschek et al., 2008; Cordella and Iannacci, 2010). 
Also, with the development of e-government, the public agencies serve citizens and businesses from a distance 
and thus they offer better service and satisfaction to citizens and businesses, and easier and more effective 
management of the work of public services(Evans and Yen, 2006; Gant and Gant, 2002; Chen, 2010). 
Given the change in both the organization and the functioning of businesses and public sector organizations on 
one hand and the state control mechanisms on the other, it is easier and more efficient to address the problems of the 
shadow economy, tax evasion and tax avoidance (Gouscos et al., 2001). 
Tax evasion is the illegal evasion of taxes by individuals, corporations and trusts. Tax evasion often entails 
taxpayers deliberately misrepresenting the true state of their affairs to the tax authorities to reduce their tax liability 
and includes dishonest tax reporting, such as declaring less income, profits or gains than the amounts actually 
earned, or overstating deductions (Becker, 1968). Tax evasion is an activity commonly associated with the shadow 
economy. 
Tax avoidance is the legal use of tax laws to reduce one's tax burden (Miller and Pangbourne, 2010). Tax 
avoidance is the usage of the tax regime to one's own advantage to reduce the amount of tax that is payable by means 
that are within the law (Scott et al., 2010). 
Both tax evasion and avoidance can be viewed as forms of tax noncompliance, as they describe a range of 
activities that intend to subvert a state's tax system, although such classification of tax avoidance is not indisputable, 
given that avoidance is lawful, within self-creating systems (Wenzel, 2002). 
Tackling the problems of the shadow economy, tax evasion and avoidance proved not to be an easy job In 
Greece. The last years, Accounting Information Systems (AIS) and e-government are the key pillars to resolve these 
serious issues (Torres et al., 2005; Hahamis et al., 2005). As a key tool,a limited information system named TAXIS 
designed, constantly expanded and improved. It became in integrated use, initially in web format and then in online 
form, with the name TAXISNET (GSIS, 2014). TAXISNET, is a platform for citizens, enterprises and public sector 
organizations. TAXISNET alone was not sufficient for full audit of economic activities and verification of declared 
elements for both natural and legal persons. Thus the use of an additional AuditingInformation System with specific 
audit functions was imperative. This new system is named ELENXIS and is now the spearhead of audit mechanisms 
for the junction and verification discrepancies, errors, omissions and oversights that TAXISNET alone could not 
detect(Elenxis1, 2014; Elenxis2, 2014; Elenxis3, 2014). 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the experts' opinions for tackling the problems of the shadow economy, tax 
evasion and avoidance. It includes the analysis of 80 questionnaires, listing the views of tax consultants in the areas 
of Evros and Kavala about combating tax avoidance and evasion. The results support the assertion that ELENXIS 
may prove an effective tool to address the aforementioned problems through suitable reforms.  
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2. Literature Review 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) present theoretical models that integrate avoidance and evasion into the overall 
decision problem faced by individuals. Then they relate the behavior predicted by the model to what is known 
empirically about the extent of evasion and avoidance, and how it responds to tax enforcement policy. 
The links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers are analyzed 
in (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). They prove that increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of 
tax sheltering, in a manner consistent with a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. These 
results can help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the 
undersheltering puzzle, and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns. 
The interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance is analyzed in (Desaia et al., 2007). They 
present that the design of the corporate tax system affects the amount of private benefits extracted by company 
insiders and that the quality of the corporate governance system affects the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax 
changes. 
An economic model of tax evasion, considering the interactions between tax authority and its sovereign 
government is proposed in (Sangheon, 2008). It is proved that tax evasion is influenced by the government's 
intention to control the economy, controlling for other determinants of tax evasion.  
The theoretical hypothesis that taxpayers’ intrinsic attitudes to honesty and social stigma are influenced by the 
taxpayers’ perceptions of the size of tax evasion as well as by their perceptions of the policy maker's effectiveness in 
exercising control over the relevant macroeconomic variables and safeguarding the interests of citizens is supported 
in (Dell’Anno, 2009). 
Cerqueti and Coppier (2009) explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static 
framework. They prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenues depends on the relevance of the 
“shame effect” of being detected in a corrupt transaction. In countries with a “low shame” effect, tax revenues grow 
as the tax rate increases. Moreover, there is a critical tax rate where the growth rate of tax revenues begins to reduce. 
In countries with a high “shame effect” tax revenues increase up to a threshold value and then decrease. 
Cerqueti and Coppier (2011) also prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic 
framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. They explore tax 
revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. They show that in all three cases — “low, middle 
and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the 
growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases.  
The implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of 
(potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes are examined in (Hindriks et al., 1999). Amongst the findings are that 
the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual 
in practice; and collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption may require that inspectors be 
paid commission on high income reports (but not on low), with the cost of this potentially creating what seems to be 
a previously-unnoticed trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
Self-employed individuals have arguably greater opportunities than wage earners to underreport their incomes. 
Swedish income and expenditure data to examine the extent of underreporting of income among self-employed 
individuals are presented in (Engström and Holmlund, 2009). 
Murphy (2005) use longitudinal survey data to show that attempts to coerce and threaten taxpayers into 
compliance can undermine the legitimacy of the Tax Office's authority, which in turn can affect taxpayers' 
subsequent compliance behaviour. It is presented that they are designed to exploit loopholes in tax law which need 
to be dealt with in a way that restores faith and equity to the system.  
Cebula (2011) empirically investigates the determinants of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion in the 
U.S. using the most current data available from the IRS. In 2010, the IRS released a new series on personal income 
tax evasion data running through the year 2005. Using this new data, the study seeks to identify any new as well as 
traditional determinants of domestic personal income tax evasion. 
An early analysis for cultures consequences in international differences for work-related values is presented by 
Hofstede (1980). 
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The relation between national cultural dimensions and tax evasion is presented by Richardson (2008). It is based 
on data from 47 countries. The findings useful for government policymakers in assessing the likelihood of tax 
evasion from cultural, legal, political, and religious perspectives, and in developing tax reform policies to reduce tax 
evasion. 
The previous study extends a previous one, developed by Tsakumis et al. (2007), where the influence of national 
culture on tax compliance levels across 50 countries is investigated. 
 
3. Approach 
In order to ascertain the views of experts on the contribution of Information Systems and e-Goverment to combat 
tax evasion and avoidance, the views of tax consultants in the areas of Evros and Kavala were recorded and 
processed. 
The self administrative questionnaire was chosen to collect the data for research. A 20-item questionnaire was 
used in this study which was conducted in November 2014. It is consisted of two components: (1) The first five 
concerning demographic data of the respondents (age, gender, education, employment-experience and income) and 
(2) the last fifteen concerning the attitudes of respondents in relation to shadow economy, tax evasion and tax 
avoidance. 
In the questionnaire we chose closed questions for quick completing and data processing. Moreover, the questions 
were multiple choice, where it is possible to choose among several predefined answers and most of them were 
questions of scale or preference, where the degree of preference of the respondent stated. They are the most 
important questions in a questionnaire, because they allow classification of the views or attitudes of respondents. 
The chosen scales in this research are the Likert and the Gutman. In Likert scale, the attitudes have five response 
categories "Totally agree" = 5, "Agree" = 4, " Neither agree nor disagree" = 3, "Disagree" = 2, "Totally disagree" = 
1.In the Gutman scale the attitudes have two response categories "Yes" and "No". 
Furthermore we attended the questionnaire marked by clearness and clarity. The questions were short and clear. 
The negative questions were avoided because they are often misunderstood, since the negative keyword is ignored 
and the respondent gives an answer that is contrary to his/her real opinion. Also we did not include questions with 
double meaning, because they require the respondent to answer two separate ideas with a single answer. 
The questionnaire was distributed to eighty six (86) people and was completed by eighty (80), so the response 
rate was 93%. All statistical analysis was conducted with the application of the SPSS version 18 software package. 
We pose the following hypotheses: 
1. Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion. 
2. The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers. 
3. The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion. 
4. Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion. 
These four hypotheses correspond to the four factors. We use the Factor Analysis with the method of Principal 
Components and with varimax rotation, We try to investigate the relationship between a number of items and to 
group them in factors. So, the four factors, based on 12 questions of our questionnaire, will be used for Factor 
Analysis. Before we proceed, we shall check the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) value 
to be suitable for Factor Analysis. Chi-Square value for Bartlett's Test of Sphericity will also be checked, to 
continue the process of Factor Analysis.  
 
4. Results 
The sample consists of 80 accountants (52.5% women).The sample allocation according to their employment is 
presented in table 1. Half of the participants in the sample are employing in private sector and about one out of four 
is Freelancer. 
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Table 1. Sample allocation according to their employment. 
Employment Frequency Percent 
Unemployed  2 2.5 
Accountant  employees in private sector  42 52.5 
Accountant  employees  in public sector  4 5.0 
Freelancer 18 22.5 
Other 14 17.5 
Total 80 100.0 
 
In table 2 we can infer that more than half of the participants (57.5%) have previous experience as accountants 
for more than 10 years, one out of four has experience for 6 to 10 years and only 17.5% of our sample have 
experience less than 5 years. 
 
Table 2. Sample allocation according to their previous experience. 
Experience Frequency Percent 
0-5 14 17.5 
6-10 20 25.0 
11-15 14 17.5 
16-25 24 30.0 
26+ 8 10.0 
Total 80 100.0 
 
Table 3 describes that almost all the participants (92.5%) believe that Information Systems is a way to address tax 
evasion.  
Table 3.Information Systems is a way to address tax evasion. 
Experience Frequency Percent 
Yes 74 92.5 
No 6 7.5 
Total 80 100.0 
 
Questionnaire consist of 12 items in a 5-point Likert scale (1=Totally disagree to 5=Totally agree). Descriptive 
statistics for these items is presented in table 4.  
 
Table 4.Descriptive statistics of the 12 items in a 5-point Likert scale. 
Items Totally 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Totally 
disagree 
The successive completions affect the perpetuation of tax evasion 15.4% 61.5% 23.1% 0% 0% 
The increasing taxation affects the perpetuation of tax evasion and the 
burgeoning of the shadow economy 
25% 60% 12.5% 2.5% 0% 
The greater the taxable income, the more prone they are the taxpayers to tax 
evasion 
17.5% 55% 20% 7.5% 0% 
Having a chaste control mechanism free from corporatism syndromes 
rigorously infringements would limit tax evasion 
27.5% 57.5% 10% 5% 0% 
If specialized private companies undertake the monitoring and collection of 
taxes, it would have better results  
10.3% 35.9% 41% 7.7% 5.1% 
In a discredited and corrupted state is finally acceptable for someone to tax 
evade 
5.1% 46.2% 33.3% 10.3% 5.1% 
The co-responsibility of tax accountants act catalytically to reduce tax evasion 5.3% 55.3% 36.8% 2.6% 0% 
If tax rates will be reduced and our country will be converted to a tax haven, 
there will be more investment to be growth and employment and therefore 
more receivable taxes overall 
35% 27.5% 32.5% 5% 0% 
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The accounting advices tax accountant for legal tax avoidance, it is morally 
reprehensible for the profession of tax accountant 
5.3% 39.5% 39.5% 15.8% 0% 
A nonnegotiable measure is to conduct all transactions electronically, so as 
actions the taxpayers have minimized natural "contacts" with the taxman 
7.5% 42.5% 37.5% 10% 2.5% 
The release of the profession of tax accountant will help to reduce the scourge 
of tax evasion 
0% 30% 40% 27.5% 2.5% 
 Lower tax rates would reduce tax evasion 30% 37.5% 27.5% 5% 0% 
 
Using Factor Analysis for the above 12 items in 5-point Likert scale with the method of Principal Components 
and with varimax rotation we try to investigate the relationship between a number of items and to group them in 
factors. We create four new factors, as presented in tables 5, 8, 10 and 12. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (KMO) value is 0.610, that means data are suitable for Factor Analysis. Chi-Square value for 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is 362.489 (p-value<0.001), so is proposed to continue the process of Factor Analysis. 
That is to say there are items that are related to each other in a satisfactory level. 
 
The first factor is associated with the belief that increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion and it 
contains four items, as presented in table 5.  
Table 5. Items that constitute the factor “Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion”. 
Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion Factor loadings 
The increasing taxation affects the perpetuation of tax evasion and the burgeoning of the shadow economy 0.785 
In a discredited and corrupted state is finally acceptable for someone to tax evade 0.610 
If tax rates will be reduced and our country will be converted to a tax haven, there will be more investment to be growth 
and employment and therefore more receivable taxes overall 
0.911 
Lower tax rates would reduce tax evasion 0.865 
 
After that, we create a new variable as the sum of the above items which consist the first factor “Increased 
taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion”. That means values of the new variable greater than three denotes 
agreement with the hypothesis that increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion. Table 6 presents 
descriptive statistics for each one of the five category groups of experience, where we notice that accountants with 
more than 26 years of experience believes to a greater extent than the others that increased taxation leads to an 
increase in tax evasion. Using Anova with dependent variable the “Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax 
evasion” and independent previous experience (F4,73 = 16.85, p-value<0.001) we conclude that the oldest and 
experienced accountants are convinced to a significantly greater extent that this statement is true. In particular we 
observe in Table 7 that the accountants with experience of more than of 26 years have a higher score on the belief 
that increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion on average from 0.87 to 2.09 compared to those have 16-
26 year experience, from 0.7 to 2 compared to those with experience of 11-15 years, from 1.02 to 2.25 compared to 
those have experience of 6-10 years and 0.39 to 1.69 in comparison with those who have experience 5 years or less. 
Figure 1 describes graphically these differences. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for previous experience. 
Experience N Mean Std. Deviation 
0-5 14 2.39 0.53 
6-10 20 1.80 0.47 
11-15 14 2.07 0.43 
16-25 22 1.95 0.59 
26+ 8 3.44 0.39 
Total 78 2.17 0.69 
 
Table 7. Bonferroni correction method for multiple comparisons. 
Previous Experience Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
26+ 0-5 1.04464* .22546 .000 .3920 1.6973 
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6-10 1.63750* .21281 .000 1.0215 2.2535 
11-15 1.36607* .22546 .000 .7134 2.0187 
16-25 1.48295* .21003 .000 .8750 2.0909 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Compare of mean values of factor “Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion” among the five 
groups of previous experience. 
 
The second factor of Factor Analysis is associated with the belief that “The accountants are jointly responsible 
for the tax evasion of their customers”. We create a new variable as the sum of the items in table 8 which consist the 
second called “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers”. Values of the new 
variable greater than three denotes agreement with this hypothesis.  
Table 8. Items that constitute the factor “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers”. 
The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers Factor loadings 
The co-responsibility of tax accountants act catalytically to reduce tax evasion -0.694 
The accounting advices tax accountant for legal tax avoidance, it is morally reprehensible for the profession of 
tax accountant 
-0.774 
 
 
At table 9 we present descriptive statistics of the factor “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax 
evasion of their customers”, separately by gender. Using Independent samples t-test method (t-value=2.53, degrees 
of freedom=72, p-value=0.014) we conclude that men feel more strongly the feeling of co- responsibility 
comparatively with women, at mean value between 0.7 to 0.58 units. 
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Table 9.Descriptive statistics of the factor “The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers”, 
separately by gender. 
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation 
Male 34 2.6765 0.52052 
Female 40 2.3500 0.57957 
 
The third factor of Factor Analysis is associated with the belief that “The tax mechanism constitutes responsible 
for tax evasion”. We create a new variable as the sum of the items in table 10 which consist the third factor called 
“The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion”. Values of the new variable greater than three denotes 
agreement with this statement. At table 11 we present descriptive statistics of the factor “The tax mechanism 
constitutes responsible for tax evasion”, separately by gender. Using Independent samples t-test method (t-value =-
2.79, degrees of freedom =78, p-value=0.007) we conclude that women espousing to a greater extent than men (on 
average higher score from 0.12 to 0.73 units) that tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion. 
 
Table 10.Items that constitute the factor “The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion”. 
The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion Factor loadings 
Having a chaste control mechanism free from corporatism syndromes rigorously infringements would limit tax evasion 0.640 
A nonnegotiable measure is to conduct all transactions electronically, so as actions the taxpayers have minimized natural 
"contacts" with the taxman 
0.852 
 
Table 11.Descriptive statistics of the factor “The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion”, separately by 
gender. 
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Male 38 2.0263 .55687 .09034 
Female 42 2.4524 .77938 .12026 
 
The fourth factor of Factor Analysis is associated with the belief that “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in 
dealing with tax evasion”. We create a new variable as the sum of the three items in table 12 which consists the 
fourth factor called “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion” after reversing the values of 
the third item since the factor loading is negative. Values of the new variable greater than three denotes agreement 
with the statement “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion”. At table 13 we present 
descriptive statistics of the factor “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion”, separately by 
the belief that Information Systems is a way to tackle tax evasion. Using Independent samples t-test method (t-value 
= -2.4, degrees of freedom =76, p-value=0.019), we conclude that  those who believe that information systems are a 
way of tackling tax evasion have on average a lower score between 0.09 and 0.97 units. 
Table 12. Items that constitute the factor “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion. 
Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion Factor loadings 
The successive completions affect the perpetuation of tax evasion 0.601 
The greater the taxable income, the more prone they are the taxpayers to tax evasion 0.648 
The release of the profession of tax accountant will help to reduce the scourge of tax evasion -0.795 
 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics of the factor “Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion”, separately by 
the belief that Information Systems is a way to tackle tax evasion. 
Information Systems is a way to tackle tax evasion? N Mean Std. Deviation 
Yes 72 2.0278 0.53295 
No 6 2.5556 0.17213 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to analyse the experts' opinions for tackling the problems of the shadow economy, 
tax evasion and avoidance that have plagued the economy and consequently greek society for decades. Accounting 
information systems and e-government considered to be the key pillars to resolve these serious issues. As a key tool, 
a limited information system, named TAXIS designed, which constantly was expanded and improved and became in 
integrated use, initially in web format and then an online form, named TAXISNET. TAXISNET alone, was not 
sufficient for full control of economic activities and verification of declared items for both natural and legal persons. 
Thus, the use of an additional accounting information subsystem with audit function was imperative. This new 
system with name ELENXIS is now the spearhead of control mechanisms for the junction and verification 
discrepancies, errors, omissions and oversights that TAXISNET alone could not detect. 
The results with the analysis of the views of the experts on the subject are presented. Eighty (80) economists 
from two different geographical areas of Northern Greece, specialised in tax consultation, expressed their views 
freely in twenty (20) carefully worded questions of a structured questionnaire. The answers were analyzed using 
special software.  
All the hypotheses were verified: 
1. Increased taxation leads to an increase in tax evasion. 
2. The accountants are jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers. 
3. The tax mechanism constitutes responsible for tax evasion. 
4. Laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion. 
The results show that their positions conform to established beliefs for decades. But in some other cases, the 
results are less expected and need more investigation to draw useful conclusions and offer a lot of food for 
discussion. 
Accountants with experience of more than of 26 years have a higher score on the belief that increased taxation 
leads to an increase in tax fraud on average. On average, men feel more intensely feeling responsibility compared 
with women jointly responsible for the tax evasion of their customers. Women believe to a greater extent than men 
that tax mechanism is responsible for tax evasion. Those who believe that information systems are a way of tackling 
tax evasion have lower average score in laxity and lack of constant attitude in dealing with tax evasion. 
The research of this study in no way could be considered full, since the sample of respondents is small, on two 
only areas and done under highly unfavorable for the country, economic conditions which dramatize and negatively 
charge the views of citizens in issues related to the economy. Enlargement and reopening of the investigation in 
future will pay more accurately the views of citizens in order to provide safer conclusions. The sample of 
respondents will consist of many different areas. There will be a second questionnaire for non specialists 
(accountants, economists) for a twofold evaluation. A causal model will be adopted which will explain the factors 
which affect the tax evasion and avoidance. A confirmatory factor analysis will be performed in the model. 
However eGovernment is a look into the future, while it can be a reality of everyday life. The implementation 
and application of appropriate information systems, in our case accounting and auditing, can help to improve the 
quality of both administrative actions and political activities and therefore should be used as a tool of public 
administration in order to effectively achieve the objectives. 
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